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Abstract 
Most people agree that discrimination is wrong, but the boundary between 
‘discrimination’ and ‘not discrimination’ is often highly contested in everyday practice. 
We explore the social representations of ‘discrimination’ as an object of study in 
qualitative interviews and focus groups with both minority (self-identified as BAME and/ 
or gay men) and majority (self-identified as white and/ or heterosexual) participants (n= 
54). Our analysis suggests three repeated and pervasive argumentative lines in social 
representations of discrimination; (1) that there are two distinct kinds of discrimination 
(hard versus soft), (2) that you need to understand the intention of the actor(s), and (3) 
that a claim of discrimination requires strong evidence. We outline the macro Functions 
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of these resources to argue that each was non-performative: they appeared to be tools to 
make claims of discrimination, but in practice they were much more effective at making 
claims of what was not discrimination. 
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What is discrimination? How ordinary people define it in practice, and what are the 
consequences of these practices? Most people agree that discrimination is wrong, and are 
motivated to avoid it (Billig, 1988/2012; Greenland, Xenias, & Maio, 2012). In practice, 
however, the boundaries between ‘discrimination’ and ‘not discrimination’ can be highly 
contested and mobilised towards specific political ends (Durrheim, Quayle, & Dixon, 
2016; Durrheim, Quayle, Whitehead, & Kriel, 2005; Jowett, 2017; Moore & Greenland, 
in press).  
In this paper, we use qualitative interviews and focus groups with both majority 
and minority participants1 to explore how participants debated the boundaries between 
‘discrimination’ and ‘not discrimination’. We will draw on both social representations 
theory and discursive psychology to explore participants’ common sense theories of 
discrimination and how these were deployed in conversation. Specifically, we will 
explore how these lines of argument made it more or less difficult to make a claim of 
discrimination.  
 
  
‘Discrimination’ as a Construct in Everyday Social Practice 
The phenomenon of ‘race talk’ is well established in the academic literature. These are 
the strategies that people use when saying something that might be heard as prejudiced, 
and range from disclaimers (e.g., ‘I’m not racist but…’), to more subtle strategies (e.g., 
discursive deracialisation) (Augoustinos & Every, 2010; Goodman, 2010; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1988; van Dijk, 1992). Researchers in this tradition often reference the ‘norm 
against prejudice’ (Billig, 1988/ 2012): a speaker is understood to be mobilising a widely 
shared understanding that prejudice is performed by a particular kind of irrational and 
immoral identity. The disclaimer ‘I’m not racist, but…’, for example, is a rhetoric that 
explicitly invokes this norm in order to make an alternative identity claim. Race talk is 
therefore performed within micro local interactions, but also involves shared cultural and 
symbolic resources, or “socially available patterns of meaning” (Verkuyten, 2005, p. 68; 
see also, Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Wetherell, 1998).  
The practice of race talk therefore has a provenance beyond the local interactional 
context. Consistent with Gibson (2015) and Howarth (2006), we theorise this provenance 
in terms of social representations (Moscovici, 1984). Interactants make claims about what 
is (and is not) discrimination by mobilising shared historical, ideological, and cultural 
discourses in which ‘racism’, ‘prejudice’, and ‘discrimination’2 are constructed as 
objects. Social representations constitute symbolic resources that can be drawn upon in 
interactions, but (importantly) they can also be reformulated through communicative 
practices (Condor & Figgou, 2012; Durrheim, 2017). There are therefore reciprocal and 
iterative relationships between local discourses and social representations.  
  
Where there are rhetorical strategies that seem to be repeated across different 
interactional contexts, different methods, and different participant groups, then we take 
these as evidencing the ‘sedimentation’ of broader ideological-cultural resources into 
everyday practices (Gibson, 2015; Potter & Hepburn, 2005). In fact, there are a number 
of tropes that are sufficiently repeated across disciplines, methods, interactants, and –isms 
(Whitehead & Stokoe, 2015) to suggest such sedimentation. These are that discrimination 
is; (1) morally wrong and irrational; (2) performed by a particular kind of problematic 
identity (uneducated, isolated, and pathological); (3) deliberate and intended by the actor. 
Consequently, an act is not discrimination when it is; (4) based on rational and objective 
realities; and (5) not intended to cause harm (Andreouli, Greenland, & Howarth, 2016; 
Augoustinos & Every 2007; Burford-Rice & Augoustinos, 2017; Capdevila & Callaghan, 
2007; Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Figgou & Condor, 2006; Goodman & Rowe, 2014; 
Greenland & Taulke-Johnson, 2017; Howarth, 2009; Kadianaki, 2014; Kirkwood, 
McKinlay & McVittie, 2013; Moore & Greenland, 2018; Sommers & Norton, 2006; 
Swim, Scott, Sechrist, Campbell, & Stangor, 2003; Wilkins, 2012).  
 
Functions of ‘Discrimination’ as a Social Representation 
We have sketched out the historical and symbolic resources that appear to be frequently 
deployed in local interactions. The rhetorical functions of these argumentative lines for 
majorities are well established in the ‘race talk’ literature (i.e., as disclaimers to avoid the 
imputation of prejudice). Interestingly, these same discourses are often also deployed by 
minorities and/or third parties who might call out discrimination (Goodman, 2010; 
Greenland & Taulke-Johnson, 2017; Kadianaki, 2014; Wilkins, 2012). The local 
  
functions of these discourses (for minorities and/or third parties) seem to be related to the 
rhetorical delicacy of making a claim of discrimination (which can generate counter-
accusations of over-sensitivity, political correctness, and an attack on free speech; 
Goodman, 2010). ‘Race talk’ resources can be deployed by minorities and/or third parties 
in order to construct arguments that will be heard as moderate and reasonable, while 
avoiding sounding ungrateful and/or confirming problematic stereotypical identities 
(Clarke, Kitzinger, & Potter, 2004; Duggan, 2002; Edwards, 2005; Goodman & Burke, 
2010; Greenland & Taulke-Johnson, 2017; Kirkwood, McKinlay, & McVittie, 2013; 
Schultz & Maddox, 2013; Whitehead, 2015; Wilkins, 2012).  
The social representations of discrimination therefore have rhetorical functions 
when deployed by both majority and minority speakers in local interactional contexts. 
However, one of the advantages of a social representations approach is that it allows us to 
move from the micro and into the macro. Durrheim, Quayle, and Dixon (2016) suggest 
that constructing some phenomena as discrimination (e.g., ‘Muslims oppress women’) 
and others as not discrimination (e.g., ‘we have to reduce net migration’) can be used to 
mobilise identities, conflict, and retaliation. The social construction of ‘discrimination’ 
therefore potentially involves the same exercise and operation of power as stigma itself 
(Link & Phelan, 2001): it can work to reinforce the status quo by minimising the 
experience of systematic discrimination, while also constructing scapegoats as legitimate 
targets. Constructing discrimination as an “abstract moral category” (Durrheim, Quayle, 
& Dixon, 2016, p. 22) makes it both emotional and malleable, shifting the focus onto one 
practice as a way of exonerating another (Durrheim et al., 2005); enabling a speaker to 
build a proper account of discrimination and to deny it in their own practice (e.g., in 
  
claiming that anti-racists are themselves being racist or elitist: Norton & Sommers, 2011; 
Durrheim et al., 2005; O' Brien et al., 2010).  
 In this paper, we draw on the distinction between ‘little d’ and ‘big D’ discourses 
(Gee, 1990) to distinguish ‘little f’ and ‘big F’ functions of the social representations of 
‘discrimination’ in talk. The former are micro, rhetorical, self-presentational strategies 
that have been described in detail in the ‘race talk’ literatures. The latter, however, are 
macro, political, and work to maintain power relations. For example, one ‘big F’ 
Function might be to minimise minority experiences of discrimination and/or make these 
experiences difficult to claim.  
 
The Current Research 
We explored social representations of discrimination ‘in action’ through the study of 
language and argument. We used qualitative interviews and focus groups with both 
majority (white and/ or heterosexual) and minority (BAME and/ or gay) participants to 
explore the lines of argument that participants mobilised when negotiating the boundaries 
of discrimination in talk. Our focus of interest was in the resources that participants 
deployed repeatedly in different local contexts (i.e., when speaking as minority or 
majority participants, and about different forms of discrimination), and the macro 
Functions of these arguments in making it more or less difficult to define an experience 
as ‘discrimination’.  
Our approach to the data was critical realist. The boundaries by which we define 
what constitutes discrimination are socially constructed, but they are also consequential 
(Durrheim, 2017; Durrheim, Quayle, & Dixon, 2016; Greenland & Taulke-Johnson, 
2017; Link & Phelan, 2001). Participants’ statuses as minorities or majorities are socially 
  
constructed (i.e., sexuality and ethnicity), but again these categories are consequential 
(Howarth, 2009; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Verkuyten 2005). Although we will talk 
about participants as ‘minorities’ or ‘majorities’, these positions are not fixed but context 
dependent: BAME participants can be understood as minorities in the context of ethnicity 
(because they divert from whiteness), and gay men can be understood as minorities in the 
context of sexuality (because they violate heteronormativity).  
 
Method 
The data consisted of focus groups and interviews with minority and majority 
participants. Focus groups were our preferred method of data production because we 
were interested in the dynamics of how ‘discrimination’ was constructed and contested 
between participants (Allen, 2005; Kitzinger, 1994; Marková, Grossen, Linell, & Salazar 
Orvig, 2007; Verkuyten, 2005). Focus groups were particularly important for participants 
who were talking as majorities because (a) we expected that they were likely to have less 
elaborated constructions (compared to minorities) (Flournoy, Prentice-Dunn, Klinger, 
2002) and (b) they might find the conversation more difficult rhetorically (Billig, 1988; 
DiAngelo & Sensoy, 2012). We expected that talking would be less troubling for 
majority participants if it was located within a focus group (compared to one to one 
interviews), and particularly if the other participants were already known to them. Focus 
groups were always made up from existing friendship and/or familial groups for this 
reason.  
 We conducted one focus group with minority participants, but most of the 
minority data was produced with one to one interviews. This reflects the trajectory of the 
  
research project, which was partly inspired by PhD research conducted by Richard 
Taulke-Johnson (2009) and Constantino Dumangane Jr. (2016) (and included in this 
analysis). One of us (KG) was struck by the complexity of minorities’ accounts in these 
datasets and began to collect comparable focus group data with majorities. The individual 
interviews with minority participants (interview sets one and two) therefore constitute 
secondary data. Primary data is from focus groups conducted with both minority (focus 
group one) and majority participants (focus groups two- six) (see table one). Participants 
in the focus groups were recruited specifically to talk about racism (focus groups one, 
four, five, and six) or homophobia (focus groups two and three). Participants in the 
interviews, in contrast, had been recruited to talk more generally about their lived 
experiences as young gay men at university (interview set one) or African- Caribbean 
men at elite universities (interview set two): homophobia or racism was merely one 
aspect of this lived experience. 37 participants were recruited as self-identified members 
of minority groups, and 17 were recruited as self-identified members of majority groups 
(we reached saturation with the majority data at this point).  
INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
As outlined above, participants were recruited in different ways according to different 
identity categories. Participants who were minorities were recruited through those 
specific categories (i.e., as gay men or people who were African Caribbean), using social 
media, University societies, snowballing, and social networks. Participants who were 
majorities were recruited through social networks: researchers would approach one 
person who was invited to put together a group from their family and/or friends. 
Participants’ majority status was therefore not explicitly foregrounded in the recruitment 
  
process, but we were always clear during recruitment that the research was about racism 
or homophobia (and in practice the groups were always homogeneous around the identity 
categories of interest). We deliberately recruited majority participants from a range of 
socio-economic backgrounds (because race talk appears to be classed: Andreouli, 
Greenland, & Howarth, 2016; Easterbrook, Kuppens, & Manstead, 2016; Kuppens & 
Spears, 2014).  
 The materials, prompts, and schedule varied according to method. The interviews 
were complex and wide ranging, and talk about discrimination was only one small part of 
a wider research programme (for fuller descriptions see Dumangane, 2016; Taulke-
Johnson, 2009). The focus groups all followed the same format: participants were shown 
materials (see table one) and invited to discuss them. There were a small number of 
probes to follow-up particular areas of interest (e.g., if participants talked about humour 
or intention), and prompts to bring participants back to topic, but otherwise the 
conversation was largely unstructured. Focus groups generally lasted between 45 – 90 
minutes. 
 
Analytic Approach 
We began by identifying extracts in which participants talked about ‘discrimination’ and 
‘-isms’. We selected extracts in which discrimination was explicitly topicalized as a 
specific category reference (e.g., ‘racism’), and as an ongoing orientation in the turns 
around that reference (Romaniuk, 2015). This included talk about what was not 
discrimination. Data included participants’ stories of their own or others’ experiences; 
arguments and debates between participants; and sometimes arguments and debates with 
  
the researcher. We did not attempt to identify examples of dialogical repression or 
stereotyping by implication (Billig, 1999; Durrheim, 2017; Whitehead, 2015).  
We coded for themes that were repeated across extracts, with no reference to 
whether participants were speaking as minorities or majorities. This part of the analysis 
was data driven and with no reference to the extant literature. We assembled extracts that 
were representative of each of the identified themes. We took a broadly critical discursive 
approach to the data (Wetherell, 1998) with a particular emphasis on how social 
representations of ‘discrimination’ were mobilised and reproduced in conversation. We 
were particularly interested in the ‘big F’ Functions of this talk i.e., how particular 
constructions of ‘discrimination’ silenced and legitimised practices. It was at this point 
that we started to explore the potential divergence between minority and majority 
accounts, and to explore the overlap between our own and the extant research. 
 
Analysis 
We identified three repeated and pervasive argumentative lines of ‘discrimination’ that 
participants used in talk: (1) that there are two different forms of discrimination; (2) that 
you need to understand intention to be definitive about ‘real’ discrimination; and (3) that 
a claim of discrimination requires strong evidence. We will draw out differences between 
minorities and majorities within each theme (where they exist), and then explore how 
each of these lines of argument were deployed in ways that made it more or less possible 
to define events and experiences as discrimination. Extracts have been selected to be 
representative of other instances and exemplars of similar constructions (Romaniuk, 
2015).  
  
Two Distinct Types of Discrimination: Hard Versus Soft 
A pervasive and recurring line of argument deployed by both majority and minority 
participants differentiated between two types of discrimination. ‘Hard’ discrimination 
was often described in terms of blatant hate, essentialised into a pathological identity 
(e.g., Howarth, 2009), and constructed as driven by negative affect (fear, anger, or hate). 
In contrast, ‘soft’ discrimination was described in terms of ignorance, inexperience, or an 
honest mistake. Participants often talked about ‘soft’ discrimination as a consequence of 
life (in)experience and therefore as transitory and malleable (rather than essentialised and 
fixed: Carr, Dweck, & Pauker, 2012; Neel & Shapiro, 2012). Many participants 
(minorities and majorities) argued that ‘soft’ discrimination was not really a form of 
discrimination at all (see also, Sommers & Norton, 2006).  
Extract one. 
John: I think the reality is you’re either a racist or you’re someone who’s either 
ignorant or just misguided.  
Interview set two: African Caribbean man; reproduced from Dumangane, 2016 
John used an ‘either…or’ structure to contrast hard and soft racism. The former was 
essentialised as an identity (‘a racist’) while the latter was more ambiguous (‘either 
ignorant or just misguided’). In this argument a person can do (or be) one or the other, 
but not both. This is consistent with research elsewhere (e.g., Sommers & Norton, 2006) 
and reproduces the distinction between blatant and subtle prejudice that has been made in 
the academic literature (Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002; Kleinpenning & 
Hagendoorn, 1993; but see also Leach, 2005). Durrheim et al. (2005) described how a 
similar distinction has been deployed within print journalism. We suggest that the 
  
repetition of this argument within our data set, the academic literature, and in the media 
constitutes evidence of the ‘sedimentation’ of a social representation.  
 As already outlined, we are less interested in the local rhetorical functions of this 
trope (‘little f’), and more interested in macro Functions (‘big F’). To what extent did 
participants’ deployment of this argument make it easier or more difficult to construct 
specific experiences as ‘discrimination’? In our analysis, this argumentative line worked 
to minimise both hard and soft forms of discrimination. Soft discrimination could be 
minimised as relatively trivial compared to hard. Hard discrimination could be minimised 
through an ‘end of racism’ discourse: both minority and majority participants described 
hard discrimination as exceptional (limited to an older generation and/ or within the past; 
Andreouli, Greenland, & Howarth, 2015; Norton & Sommers, 2011).  
Extract two. 
Constantino (researcher): When you came here and people first saw you do you 
think they have a certain idea of who or what you were before you they 
ever got to talk to you? 
Dwayne: Yeah I think it's natural that most people will kind of make snap 
judgments (laughs) I recall one thing. One of my friends, this was like 
whilst we were becoming friends: he said that the first time he met me he 
thought I was going to stab him. 
Constantino: Can I ask what your friend's ethnicity was? 
Dwayne: He's from [name of town], it's down south. I think there's very few 
Black people there 
Constantino: Very interesting. And yet you’re friends now? 
  
Dwayne: Yeah I mean I think that's one thing I've learned. Just in terms of the 
ignorance that people can have. And I think I'm somebody who would 
never kind of blame people for that position. If anything I would try to 
teach them and show them or help them to kind of see how ridiculous they 
are (laughs)  
Constantino: So would you say that's more ignorance than racism? And have you 
experienced racism as well, I'm just curious? 
Dwayne: I think it's very unlikely that anyone would be the victim of kind of 
what's the word I'm looking for (pause) kind of just overt direct racism, 
like in today's day and age. 
Constantino: What do you equate is being direct racism can you give me an 
example? What does it mean to you? 
Dwayne: For someone to call you N- word [sic] or something.  
Interview set two: African Caribbean man; reproduced from Dumangane, 2016 
Over several turns, Dwayne and Constantino co-constructed a two types of discrimination 
argument: one soft (based on ‘ignorance’), and one hard (based on ‘overt direct racism’). 
Although Dwayne constructed the latter as racism, he deployed the ‘two types’ argument 
to minimise both forms. He constructed his own experience as relatively minor by 
contrasting it with the ‘overt direct racism’ which existed in the past. Deploying this 
either/ or contrast enabled Dwayne to construct an absolute discontinuity between ‘overt 
direct racism’ and the experience that he had described (Greenland & Taulke-Johnson, 
2017; see also, Leach, 2005). He also minimised hard discrimination as happening very 
rarely ‘in today’s day and age’ (Andreouli, Greenland, & Howarth, 2016).  
  
Participants who were minorities repeatedly used the ‘two types’ argumentative 
line in ways that constructed potentially problematic experiences as minor: indeed, they 
often said that they were ‘lucky’ that they had not experienced discrimination, even while 
talking about experiences that events that could be constructed as low level harassment 
(Anderson, 2002; Greenland, Andreouli, Augoustinos, & Taulke-Johnson, in 
preparation). Participants who were majorities deployed the ‘two types’ argumentative 
line to similar effect: in extract three, white majority participants discussed television 
personality Jeremy Clarkson’s use of the word ‘nigger’. Participants described this as an 
honest and inadvertent mistake that should not be taken too seriously. 
Extract three. 
Harvey: But like he, he quite obviously didn’t want to say it so he muffled it 
under his voice, and he muffled it quite obviously so he, there was no 
intent 
Annabelle: He acknowledged that there was something wrong but there was, he 
knew that there was, he thought it was a controlled situation where it 
wouldn’t get out and wouldn’t necessarily, anyone that it would offend, 
clearly he wasn’t around them 
Harvey: And he probably had the imp, had the idea that it wouldn’t be aired once 
he had done it so  
Tod: I just don’t, I mean like that, even if that, even if Jeremy Clarkson is a racist 
in his spare time and we just don’t know about it that one situation doesn’t 
make him a racist 
Harvey: Not at all 
  
Tod: Because it was not aimed at anyone, it wasn’t ever going to be shown to 
anyone, if he then goes home and like does it all the time in front of his 
children and impressionable people it’s a different situation 
Harvey: Yeah, but if a video got leaked of him like laughing at a video of people 
getting lynched then yeah he probably would be a racist, but like that 
doesn’t suggest at all like that he is a racist, there was obviously no racial 
intent in what he said because he tried to cover it up for one 
Focus group four: young white middle class participants  
While Dwayne (extract two) constructed the use of the ‘N- word’ as indicative of racism 
when used directly to his face (‘For someone to call you N- word or something’), the 
white majority participants in extract three collaboratively constructed (Condor, 2006; 
Durrheim, 2017) the same word as a relatively minor slip of the tongue. They deployed 
three lines of argument; first, that it was not intentional (‘he quite obviously didn’t want 
to say it so he muffled it’); second, that no one was harmed (‘anyone it would offend, 
clearly he wasn’t around them’; and third, that it was trivial compared to ‘hard’ 
discrimination (‘laughing at a video of people getting lynched’). Harvey consolidated this 
argument with an ‘if… but’ hypothetical contrast (‘if a video of him got leaked… but that 
doesn’t suggest at all like that he is a racist’). As in extracts one and two, the contrast was 
key: Harvey constructed Clarkson’s actions as ‘soft’ by building a contrast with ‘hard’.  
 The ‘two types’ line of argument worked to construct some events as 
‘discrimination’ while constructing other events as ‘not discrimination’. Durrheim et al., 
(2005) described this as ‘splitting’: constructing a small number of exceptional acts as 
discrimination in order to deny everyday experiences. Our participants constructed hard 
  
forms of discrimination as problematic but also exceptional. Soft discrimination (in 
comparison to hard) was not really discrimination at all. Importantly, however, there was 
slippage between what was constructed as hard and what was constructed as soft: the 
argument hinged on the contrast rather than the content of a specific act. Thus, use of the 
‘N-word’ could shift from hard (extract two) to soft (extract three) depending on the 
comparative context. The ‘two types’ argumentative line could therefore be deployed to 
minimise all but the most egregious act of deliberate hate.  
You Need to Understand Intention 
Extracts two and three above also contained lines of argument about ‘intention’ (Dwayne 
distinguished between thoughtless ‘snap judgements’ and ‘overt direct’ use; Harvey made 
specific reference to ‘racial intent’). Participants often talked about importance of 
context: in practice, this meant understanding the actor’s intention. In Extract 4, majority 
participants talked about the word ‘gay’ (which they used as a synonym for ‘pathetic’ or 
‘rubbish’). They argued that it was not the word that was the problem, but how it was 
said. 
Extract four. 
Ellie: It’s definitely how you say it ain’t it. Like if you want to hurt someone. Like 
if one of the boys want to hurt another of the boys. 
Katie: Yeah he didn’t say it with the intention to upset or cause anyone to like, be 
offended by it. He was just saying he didn’t like it really. 
Focus group three: young white working class women 
  
In this line of argument, it was the intention of the speaker (‘if you want to hurt 
someone’) that transformed the word into an act of discrimination. Minority participants 
often made the same argument.  
Extract five. 
Will: If – if somebody’s saying something you know to intentionally offend 
somebody, it doesn’t make any difference really which word they use you 
know, the bottom line is they’re trying to offend you. But you know I 
suppose if you know somebody says ‘Oh that’s gay’ or you know like 
something happens – something that happens – something rubbish 
happens like ‘Oh that’s gay’ or ‘That’s queer’ or ‘That’s bent’ I mean I’ve 
– I’ve said all of those things. But you know if it’s directed at a person and 
to offend a person that – that’s when it’s offensive.  
Interviews set two. Young gay man.  
Will’s argument here is very similar to extract four: it was not what was said, as much as 
the intention behind it. Participants deployed argumentive lines about the actor’s 
intention: if the actor did not intend to ‘offend’, or ‘hurt’, then it was not discrimination.  
 Argumentive lines about intention has been recorded elsewhere with a range of 
different participants and methods (Burford-Rice & Augoustinos, 2017; Sommers & 
Norton, 2006; Walton, Priest, & Paradies, 2013). It has also been reproduced in 
laboratory studies: Swim et al. (2003) demonstrated that participants are strongly 
persuaded by intention arguments (but for a critique of these experimental designs see 
Potter & Edwards, 1990). Again, we would argue that the repetition of this argument 
suggests the ‘sedimentation’ of a social representation. What are the Functions of this 
  
argumentative line? We suggest that the intention argument can be deployed to construct 
a recognisable and defensible account of discrimination, while also providing the tools by 
which it can be repeatedly disclaimed in practice: ‘intention’ was frequently deployed by 
our participants to argue that an event was not discrimination.  
Constructing events as ‘not discrimination’ using intention arguments 
Readers will be familiar with arguments around to what extent humour can constitute a 
form of discrimination (e.g., Durrheim, 2017; Grigg & Mandelson, 2015; Walton, Priest, 
& Paradies, 2013; see also, Douglass, Mirpuri, English, & Yip, 2016). Both majorities 
and minorities repeatedly stated that humour and ‘banter’ were not discrimination, and 
deployed intention arguments to achieve this. Specifically, they constructed arguments 
about alternative intentions (i.e., the intention to be funny rather than the intention to 
discriminate).  
Extract six. 
Richard (researcher): Er. You talked about banter. 
Daniel: Yeah. 
Richard: Is that homophobic? Or – I mean not homophobic - is that – 
Daniel: Yeah it’s like they do take the mick I think. 
Richard: Taking the mick, yeah. 
Daniel: But I don’t – I think you could take it offensively, but they don’t mean it 
nastily. They take the mick out of everyone. And that’s – I dunno. I don’t 
take it offensively.  
Interviews set two. Young gay man.  
  
Extract six is representative of many minority accounts. Although Daniel appeared alert 
to the dilemma in constructing humour as not discrimination (see also, Greenland & 
Taulke-Johnson, 2017), he constructed the actions of his friends as not discrimination by 
deploying both an intention argument (‘they don’t mean it nastily’) and a claim that it 
was not category based (‘They take the mick out of everyone’). Majority participants, in 
contrast, often constructed humour as self-evidently unproblematic: participants deployed 
argumentative lines in which the intention to be funny was sufficient to construct an 
event as not discrimination.  
Importantly, however, argumentive lines about intention were deployed to make 
claims about a whole range of events.  
Extract seven. 
Ross: Well they are what we would call each other ain’t it. As a laugh. Probably 
wouldn’t call a gay person it. Unless they done something to piss you off. 
Ryan: Yeah yeah. Like when we was out, and that boy 
[Inaudible] 
Ryan: I know. Yeah he said to me I pushed in front of him right. Um. And I 
didn’t, I was queuing as much as he was. And you could tell he was gay. 
Right. So I said to him “Look buddy I was here first.” And he was offering 
me on, mind. But, um, I knew he was gay. He kept shouting. So I told him 
to fuck off the bent twat. 
  Focus group two. Young white working class men. 
As in extract four, Ross and Ryan were talking about the word ‘gay’. In the first turn, 
Ross contrasted two different contexts and intentions: an intention to have ‘a laugh’ 
  
versus an intention to respond to someone who has ‘done something to piss you off’. In 
the second turn, Ryan described an incident which culminated in the use of an identity 
category (‘fuck off the bent twat’). The use of an identity category is often sufficient for a 
statement to be heard as discrimination (Durrheim, Quayle, & Dixon, 2016). However, 
Ryan constructed his action as a reasonable response to provocation (‘And he was 
offering me on, mind... He kept shouting’) (Durrheim, Quayle, & Dixon, 2016; Goodman 
& Rowe, 2014). In this account, Ryan’s intention was to be deliberately offensive, but as 
a rational and morally creditable response to an external reality (Capdevila & Callaghan, 
2007; Augoustinos & Every, 2007; see also, Rai & Fiske, 2011). The identity category of 
the other person was incidental to the argument, and the insult (‘bent twat’) simply the 
nearest verbal weapon to hand. In practice, the presence of any alternative ‘intention’ 
seemed to be sufficient to construct an event as not discrimination.  
A Claim of Discrimination Requires Strong Evidence 
Participants (minorities and majorities) frequently said that it was difficult to define an 
action as discrimination, and that you had to know what someone really thought before 
you could do so.  
Extract eight. 
 Harvey: someone like Jeremy Clarkson, not a lot of people know who he is as a 
person, you don’t know whether he says that erm, that he whether he says 
nigger under his breath as a racist or as a non-racist, because you don’t know 
him. So if so like racism is so dependent on the beliefs that a person has, 
because if you know what their beliefs are then you know whether or not 
something that comes out, you’ll know what the meaning of what is, you’ll 
  
have a much better idea of the meaning of what is coming out of their mouth 
Focus group four: young white middle class participants 
In this account, Harvey said that you cannot judge someone (in this case, Clarkson) as a 
racist without some form of psychological omniscience (‘you don’t know him… if you 
know what their beliefs are then you’ll have a much better idea of the meaning of what is 
coming out of their mouth’). We can see how this claim is related to the ‘two types of 
discrimination’ and ‘intention’ lines of argument (which emphasise the thoughts of the 
actor over the consequences of the act). Majority participants argued that it was not 
possible to construct Jeremy Clarkson’s use of ‘nigger’ as discrimination, because they 
could not know what he really thought. In the absence of this information, they argued, it 
was necessary to give him the benefit of the doubt. 
 The psychologization of discrimination (i.e., the construction of discrimination as 
a consequence of individuals’ psychologies) was almost universal among majority 
participants when they talked about specific people or events. This trope has been 
repeated sufficiently across different research designs (Billig, 1988/ 2012; Figgou & 
Condor, 2006; Kadianaki, 2014; Moore & Greenland, 2018; Sommers & Norton, 2006) 
and in the research literature (Condor, 1988; Howarth, 2009; Thomas & Brunsma, 2013) 
to suggest the sedimentation of a social representation. What might be the Function of 
this resource? It has been noted elsewhere how the psychologization of discrimination 
obscures its institutional and intergenerational nature (both inside and outside academic 
practice: Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Condor, 1988; Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005; 
Howarth, 2009; Kitzinger & Perkins, 1993). In addition, we suggest that it renders 
discrimination as an explanation of last resort (see also, Kirkwood, McKinlay, & 
  
McVittie, 2013). Participants constructed discrimination as so serious that it required a 
level of ‘proof’ that was rarely available in practice (see also, Goodman & Burke, 2010). 
Majority participants said that they were unwilling to construct an event as discrimination 
without sufficient evidence of what an individual actor really thought and/or a tracking of 
their actions across time and situation (Kelley, 1967). In the absence of this knowledge, 
participants argued, they could not know the meaning of an action, and therefore could 
not define it as discrimination. This was almost universal among majority participants 
when they talked about specific people or events.   
There were relatively few examples in the data in which minority participants 
made claims of discrimination. When they did, however, they made little or no reference 
to the psychology of the actors. Instead, they worked up high facticity (Potter, 1996), 
high contrast accounts.  
Extract nine. 
David: I was, where was this, late 90s? Yeah late 90s. And I volunteered to erm 
be a collective for a very high ranking charity. I forgotten which one, but it was a 
well-recognised charity, ok? We were erm taken in, we were trained, we were told 
exactly what to do. We were given the same things to wear, like a sash, a badge, 
an ID badge and erm a collecting box. Plastic. And we were told, you you must 
not shake them, because you, that is harassing. [[BACKGROUND TALK]] So we, 
everyone, I was one, I was I think the only black person, in that particular thing, 
but we were all told the same thing, so we’re all, all given the same things to 
wear, same and an ID badge which clearly had your identity on it and told exactly 
what to do. So, you know, everyone, the same information. Now I was positioned 
  
outside erm Selfridges on Oxford Street. Selfridges. Nice, very nice there. And I 
stood there. And that is exactly what I did. I stood there. I didn’t open my mouth, 
didn’t shake the box and didn’t move. I was stationary. I was there for a little 
while and all of a sudden a police van pulled up outside Selfridges. [[LAUGHTER]] 
No, this is, no. A police van. Seriously. Flashing lights. Pulled outside Selfridges. 
I started looking around to see what happened, like oh what’s happened, exciting, 
I must have missed something. So I’m looking around and they get me and they 
take me in the van [[GASPS]] [[LONG PAUSE]]. When I asked them what had 
happened, they said somebody had rang, an anonymous phone call, saying there 
was somebody outside Selfridges making a disturbance [[OHHH]] They must have 
described me! I’m assuming they described me because they didn’t pick anyone 
else up. And it was me they took into the back of the van.  
Focus group one. African Caribbean participants.  
David built a story with high facticity, including time, location, and a rich detailed 
description of his actions (‘And I stood there. That is exactly what I did. I stood there. I 
didn’t open my mouth, I didn’t shake the box and I didn’t move. I was stationary’). He 
also used contrasts to emphasise repeatedly how he was ‘exactly the same’ as other 
volunteers (‘we were all told the same thing and given the same things to wear, and given 
an ID badge with our identity on it and told exactly what to do’). This contrast provides a 
detailed and direct comparison between his own (minority) experience and the experience 
of majorities (‘I was I think the only black person… but we were all told the same 
thing’). In this account, the only remaining explanation for being stopped by the police is 
his ethnicity.  
  
 Minority participants constructed high facticity, high contrast accounts when 
making a claim of discrimination (for other examples, see Andreouli, Greenland, & 
Howarth, 2016; Varjonen, Jurva, & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2015). At a micro level, they 
seemed to be alert to the ways in which their claims could be contested, and that they 
themselves could be heard as unreasonable or irrational (Edwards, 2005; Goodman, 
2010; Kirkwood, McKinlay, & McVittie, 2013). At a macro level, however, these 
arguments may be one of the few ways to make a claim when discrimination is widely 
constructed (i) as a psychological phenomenon (i.e., in the absence of a legitimate means 
of demonstrating an actor’s beliefs or intentions) (ii) that requires strong evidence. Note 
that these arguments are only performable in a very limited set of circumstances.  
 
Conclusions 
In our analysis, we have explored how ‘discrimination’ was constructed and contested in 
talk. We moved from an analysis of race talk into an analysis of the social representations 
of ‘discrimination’ as an object of study. Participants turned repeatedly to three specific 
lines of argument, which (we argue) indicated a sedimentation of social representations 
into local practice, and which worked to minimise and silence claims of discrimination. 
The ‘two types’ argument worked to minimise both hard and soft forms of discrimination 
(extract 2): ‘hard’ discrimination was constructed as very rare and located in the past, 
while ‘soft’ discrimination was constructed as minor when compared to ‘hard’. The 
‘intentions’ argument emphasised the psychologized state of individual actor(s) which 
was difficult to evidence and easy to contest (extracts 6- 7). Finally, participants argued 
that you could not make a claim of discrimination without strong evidence, and that this 
  
required knowing what someone ‘really thought’ (extract 8). In the absence of such gold 
standard evidence, participants generally argued that actors should be given the benefit of 
the doubt. In practice, then, participants (both majorities and minorities) generally made 
discrimination an explanation of last resort (Kirkwood, McKinlay, & McVittie, 2013). 
 The three argumentative lines that we have outlined therefore actively 
undermined the naming of actions or events as discrimination. They were non-
performative (Ahmed, 2006): they appeared to be tools to make claims of discrimination, 
but in practice they were much more effective at making claims of what was not 
discrimination. ‘Discrimination’ was highly contestable when applied to everyday 
experience: exceptional, remote, and othered.  
 A social representations approach enables us to explore the ways in which these 
resources are consequential for social justice (i.e., in silencing potential claims of 
discrimination). Understanding these tools and how they are deployed (in local 
interactions, in public debate, in the media) enables us to begin to problematize and 
challenge them. Specifically, we note the pervasive psychologization and 
individualization of discrimination across the three argumentative lines: there was a 
repeated emphasis on the beliefs, intentions, and thoughts of individual actors. These 
arguments may work to facilitate the identification of a small number of ‘bad apples’, but 
potentially obscure institutional and intergenerational forms of discrimination. 
Alternative arguments would shift the focus away from individual actors onto the 
experiences of targets as collectives, and the chronic (rather than acute) harm of both 
microaggressions and institutional discrimination (e.g., the Black Lives Matter and 
#metoo campaigns; see also, Fevre & Krause, 2017). 
  
 This analysis constitutes a timely and important complement to Durrheim, 
Quayle, and Dixon (2016), in that we have begun to explore the specific instantiations of 
‘discrimination’ as a category. These resources became evident when repeated across 
different participants (i.e., majorities and minorities), different methods (interviews and 
focus groups), and in talking about two different forms of discrimination (racism and 
homophobia). They were evident over a sustained and protracted length of time (2007- 
2015). Finally, they were also evident in the extant research (both qualitative and 
quantitative). We note, however, that the rhetorical delicacy with which our participants 
made their arguments contrasts sharply with the ‘call to arms’ discourses described in 
Durrheim et al. (and with the vilification of alleged perpetrators in social and national 
media). Further research should explore this bifurcation in responses, where some claims 
of discrimination are problematized and underplayed, while others are reproduced 
uncritically. We tentatively suggest that this bifurcation may partly relate to the power 
(either institutional or collective) of those making the claim and/or the reputation of the 
alleged perpetrators. Further research might also explore the roles of defense and 
catharsis in the reproduction of these claims.  
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Notes 
1 Although we will refer to ‘minorities’ and ‘majorities’ in the text, these categories 
 are also socially constructed (see section ‘the current research’). 
2 We focus on ‘discrimination’ (as opposed to ‘prejudice’) as a broader 
 phenomenon that can encompass both institutional discrimination and 
 unconscious bias. 
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Table 1: Participants 
Minority 
participants 
Interviews set one (n= 15) (2007) 
Young gay men talking about their experiences at University, of which 
  
homophobia was one part. Participants were interviewed twice. 
Researcher (RTJ) was an out gay man (Taulke-Johnson, 2009).  
Interviews set two (n= 17) (2014) 
Young African Caribbean men talking about their experiences at elite 
universities, of which racism was one part. Participants were interviewed 
twice with some occasional additional follow-ups. Materials included 
‘shit white girls say’ video 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylPUzxpIBe0. Researcher (CD) was 
an African- American man (Dumangane, 2016).  
Focus group one (n= 5) (2014) 
African Caribbean middle class participants, talking about racism. 
Participants were men and women aged between 30 and 50. Materials 
were still images relating to African Caribbean identity and experience. 
Researcher (KG) was a white woman of comparable class and age. 
Majority 
participants 
Focus group two (n= 3) (2013) 
Young white working class men talking about homophobia. All 
participants identified as heterosexual. Materials were ‘no homophobes’ 
website (www.nohomophobes.com). Researcher (MC) was a young 
woman from the same peer group.  
Focus group three (n= 3) (2013) 
Young white working class women talking about homophobia. All 
participants identified as heterosexual. Materials were ‘no homophobes’ 
website (www.nohomophobes.com). Researcher (MC) was a young 
  
woman from the same peer group.  
Focus group four (n= 4) (2014) 
Young white middle class people (three women and one man) talking 
about racism. Materials were Jeremy Clarkson ‘eeny meeny miney mo’ 
video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AR7QYJnqXhg. Researcher 
(GW) was a young woman from the same peer group. 
Focus group five (n= 3) (2014) 
White women university students talking about racism. Materials were 
Jeremy Clarkson ‘eeny meeny miney mo’ video 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AR7QYJnqXhg. Researcher (GW) 
was a young woman from the same peer group.  
Focus group six (n= 4) (2015) 
Older white working class talking about racism (two men and two 
women). Materials were Jeremy Clarkson ‘eeny meeny miney mo’ video 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AR7QYJnqXhg. Researcher (GW) 
was a young middle class woman.  
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